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Why is informal employment more common in some countries? 
an exploratory analysis of 112 countries
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper evaluates competing explanations for the greater prevalence of informal 
employment in some countries rather than others. These variously explain informal 
employment to be a result of either economic under-development and the lack of modernisation 
of governance (modernisation theory), higher taxes and too much state intervention (neo-
liberal theory) or inadequate government intervention to protect workers from poverty 
(political economy theory).
Methodology: To do this, an International Labour Organisation data base produced in 2018 on 
the prevalence of informal employment in 112 countries (comprising 90 per cent of the global 
workforce) is analysed, and macro-level economic and social conditions reflecting each of these 
theories tested using bivariate regressions.
Findings: The prevalence of informal employment ranges from 94.6% of total employment in 
Burkina Faso to 1.2% in Luxembourg. Evaluating the validity of the competing theories, neo-
liberal theory is refuted, and a call made to synthesise the modernisation and political economy 
perspectives in a new neo-modernisation theory that tentatively associates the greater 
prevalence of informal employment with lower economic under-development, greater levels of 
public sector corruption, smaller government and lower levels of state intervention to protect 
workers from poverty.
Practical implications: This paper tentatively reveals the structural economic and social 
conditions that need to be addressed globally to reduce informal employment. 
Originality/value: This is the first paper to report the results of a harmonised dataset based on 
common criteria to measure the varying prevalence of informal employment globally (across 
112 countries representing 90 per cent of global employment) in order to determine the 
structural economic and social conditions associated with higher levels of informal 
employment.
Keywords: informal employment; informal economy; shadow economy; informal sector; 
development economics; economic development.
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Introduction
Why is the informal employment more prevalent in some countries and smaller in others? For 
much of the last century, there was a clear consensus in scholarship. The belief was that 
informal employment was a developing country phenomenon resulting from economic under-
development and a lack of modernisation of governance, which would naturally and inevitably 
disappear with economic development and modernisation (Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 
1959). In recent decades, however, it has been revealed that informal employment prevails in 
developed as well as developing economies (Slavnic, 2010; Webb et al., 2009; Williams and 
Lansky, 2013; Williams and Schneider, 2016) and appears to be growing in many nations 
(Dibben and Williams, 2012; ILO, 2013). This paper advances the resultant scholarship. The 
aim is to evaluate the com eting theories that have emerged to explain the cross-country 
variations in the prevalence of informal employment.
To achieve this, the first section briefly reviews how informal employment can be 
defined and measured, and how the cross-country variations have been variously explained as 
resulting from either economic under-development and the lack of modernisation of governance 
(modernisation theory), too much state interference (neo-liberal theory) or inadequate state 
intervention to protect workers from poverty (political economy theory). Revealing that few 
attempts have been made to evaluate these contrasting explanations using a harmonised dataset, 
this paper fills this lacuna. To do so, the second section introduces the data, namely the 
International Labour Organisations (ILO) harmonized data on the share of informal 
employment in total employment and in the informal sector across 112 developed and 
developing economies comprising 90 per cent of global employment, along with the indicators 
that can be used to evaluate the validity of the competing theories. The third section then reports 
the results followed in the fourth and final section by a discussion of the implications for theory 
and policy.
Defining, measuring and explaining informal employment
Defining informal employment
In this paper, the definition of informal employment agreed by the International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians (ICLS) is used (Hussmans, 2005; ILO, 2011, 2012, 2018). This recognises 
that the informal realm can be defined using either the enterprise or the employment relationship 
as the unit of observation. As Table 1 reveals, if the enterprise is used as the unit of observation, 
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then informality is viewed in terms of employment in the informal sector (A and B) whilst if 
the employment relationship is the unit of observation, informality is viewed in terms of 
informal employment (A and C). In this paper, the employment relationship is used as the unit 
of analysis by examining those engaged in informal employment (A+C).   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In 1993, the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians defined an informal sector 
enterprise as a private unincorporated enterprise that is unregistered or small in terms of the 
number of employed persons. An unincorporated enterprise is defined as a production unit not 
constituted as a separate legal entity independent of the individual (or group of individuals) who 
owns it, and for which no complete set of accounts is kept. Meanwhile, an enterprise is defined 
as unregistered if it is not registered under specific forms of national legislation (e.g., factories 
or commercial acts, tax or social security law, professional groups' regulatory acts). An 
enterprise is defined as small if its number of employees is below a specific threshold (e.g. five 
employees) determined by national circumstances (Hussmans, 2005; ILO, 2011, 2012, 2018). 
Here, therefore, informality was defined using the enterprise as the unit of analysis. 
However, the recognition that informal jobs exist in formal and informal enterprises, 
and that defining informality as informal enterprise missed a considerable amount of 
informality, in 2003, the 17th ILCS adopted the employment relationship as the unit of analysis 
and defined those in informal employment as persons whose main jobs lack basic social or legal 
protections or employment benefits and recognised that they may be found in the formal sector, 
informal sector or households. Persons in informal employment were seen to include: (a) own-
account workers self-employed in their own informal sector enterprises; (b) employers self-
employed in their own informal sector enterprises; (c) contributing family workers; (d) 
members of informal producers cooperatives; (e) employees with informal jobs in formal 
sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, and paid domestic workers employed in 
households; (f) own-account workers engaged in self-provisioning, if considered employed in 
the sense that the production makes an important contribution to household consumption (ILO, 
2012, 2013). In relation to (e) above, namely employees with informal jobs, the 17th ILCS 
defines an employee as in informal employment if the employment relationship is, in law or in 
practice, not subject to national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or 
entitlement to certain employment benefits (e.g., notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual 
or sick leave) (ILO, 2012, 2013, 2018).
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Hence, besides informal employment in informal sector enterprises (A), there is also 
formal employment in informal sector enterprises (B) and informal employment in formal 
sector enterprises (C). Indeed, the existence of informal employment in informal enterprises 
(A) is seen to signal a more intense form of informalisation because both the employment 
relationship and enterprise is informal, which is not the case with formal jobs in informal sector 
(B) and informal jobs in formal enterprises (C). In this paper, in consequence, the employment 
relationship is the unit of analysis and the prevalence of informality is measured by analysing 
the proportion of total employment that is informal employment (A+C), whilst the intensity of 
informality is analysed by examining the proportion of all employment that is informal 
employment in informal enterprises (A).  
Measuring the prevalence informal employment
Calculating the level informal employment is difficult because this employment relationship is 
hidden from view. Examining the cross-country variations in informal employment is even 
more difficult because harmonised definitions and survey methods are rare. Despite these 
problems, recent decades have seen various attempts to do so. Two methods have been used, 
namely indirect survey methods which use either proxy indicators of the prevalence of informal 
employment or seek statistical traces of informal employment in macroeconomic data collected 
for other purposes (Williams and Schneider, 2016), and direct surveys (OECD, 2002, 2012; 
Ram and Williams, 2008). 
Indirect methods involve four main techniques: the use of individual non-monetary 
proxy indicators such as the number of very small enterprises (ILO, 2002) or electricity demand 
(e.g., Friedman et al., 2000; Lacko, 1999); the use of individual monetary proxy indicators such 
as the level of cash deposits (Gutmann, 1977) or money transactions (Feige, 2012;  Frey and 
Weck, 1983), the use of income/expenditure discrepancies at either the aggregate or individual 
level (Paglin, 1994) and the use of multiple proxy indicators (e.g., Schneider, 2013; Schneider 
and Williams, 2013). The problem, however, is that there is little evidence that the proxy 
indicators used are appropriate measures of the level of informal employment (for a detailed 
review, see Williams and Schneider, 2016).
Direct surveys, meanwhile, can either take the form of quantitative, qualitative or mixed 
methods surveys. All direct surveys evaluating cross-country variations in the prevalence of 
informal employment have been quantitative surveys. Examples include a three-country 
comparison of some European countries (Pedersen, 2003), a 2007 Eurobarometer survey of 
informal employment across the European Union (Williams, 2013) and an analysis of 41 less 
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developed economies (Williams, 2015). Until now, no direct surveys have been undertaken of 
cross-country variations in the prevalence and intensity of informal employment across both 
developed and developing countries. As will be shown below, this has now been resolved with 
the production by the ILO of harmonized data on the share of informal employment in total 
employment using data from national labour force surveys or similar national household 
surveys which allow harmonized international comparisons (ILO, 2018).
Explaining cross-country variations in informal employment
Reviewing scholarship explaining the prevalence of informal employment, its variable size 
across countries has been variously explained as resulting from either economic under-
development and a lack of modernisation of governance (modernisation theory), state over-
interference in the free market (neo-liberal theory) or inadequate state intervention to protect 
workers from poverty (political economy theory). Each is here considered in turn.
For much of the twentieth century, informal employment was seen to be little more than 
a leftover from a pre-modern mode of production that was fading from view. As such, little 
attention was paid to this form of work that was perceived as a residue and as disappearing. 
Economies in which informal employment persisted were thus conceptualised as under-
developed and even backward compared with those countries in which the modern formal 
economy was prevalent, which were viewed as advanced and developed (Geertz, 1963; 
Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 1959). The result was that informal employment became a signal of 
under-development and a phenomenon that would disappear with economic development and 
the modernisation of governance. There is thus asserted to be a higher prevalence of informal 
employment in less developed economies with a lack of modernisation of governance. To test 
its validity, the following hypothesis can be evaluated:
Modernisation hypothesis (H1): informal employment will be more prevalent in 
countries with: (H1a) less developed economies and (H1b) greater public sector 
corruption.
The recognition that informal employment is not declining, even in some countries witnessing 
economic development and modernisation, led to the emergence of new theorisations. For neo-
liberal scholars, the prevalence of informal employment is a result of state over-interference in 
the economy and welfare, and participation a rational economic decision voluntarily taken by 
workers and enterprises to escape the formal economy due to the excessive costs, time and 
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effort required to operate in the formal economy (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; 
London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984). For these neo-liberal scholars, when 
workers and enterprises are confronted by high taxes and over-regulation, informal employment 
is a rational economic strategy (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007). Informal 
employment for neo-liberals is therefore more prevalent in countries with higher taxes and 
greater levels of state interference. To test the validity of this neo-liberal theory, the following 
hypothesis can be evaluated:
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): informal employment will be more prevalent in countries 
with: (H2a) higher tax rates and (H2b) higher levels of state interference in the free 
market.
For scholars of a political economy persuasion, in stark contrast, the prevalence of informal 
employment directly results from the advent of a de-regulated open global economy (Castells 
and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Slavnic, 2010), and outsourcing 
and subcontracting are key means by which informal employment has become fully integrated 
into contemporary global capitalism. Contrary to modernisation theory, therefore, the informal 
economy is far from a vestige of earlier stages in economic development. Instead, informality 
is part and parcel of the processes of modernization (Fernandez-Kelly, 2006, p. 18). Therefore, 
this is a largely unregulated sphere involving low-paid insecure work conducted under 
sweatshop-like conditions as a survival tactic by marginalised populations (Castells and 
Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2002). In the emergent post-Fordist and post-
socialist era, informal employment is a survival mechanism due to the absence of alternative 
means of livelihood. To test the validity of this political economy theory, the following 
hypothesis can be evaluated:
Political economy hypothesis (H3): informal employment will be more prevalent in those 
countries with lower levels of state intervention to protect workers from poverty.
Evaluating the rival theories
Until now, most explanations for cross-country differences in the level of informal employment 
have adopted one of the above three logics. Some studies, nevertheless, have contended that 
different theories apply to different populations or activities, such as political economy 
explanations to informal waged employment and neo-liberal explanations to informal self-
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employment (Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams et al., 2013), political economy explanations 
to relatively deprived populations and neo-liberal explanations to relatively affluent populations 
(Evans et al., 2006; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Williams, 2004; Williams and Windebank, 2006), or 
political economy explanations to womens informal work and neo-liberal explanations to the 
voluntary exit rationales that characterise mens engagement (Franck, 2012; Grant, 2013; 
Williams, 2011).
Few studies have conducted an evidence-based evaluation of these competing theories 
in relation to cross-country variations in the scale of informal employment. The exceptions are 
study of the European Union (e.g., Williams, 2013) and 41 less developed economies 
(Williams, 2015). Both find evidence to support the tenets of both the modernisation and 
political economy theories but little evidence to support neo-liberal theory. No studies have so 
far evaluated the validity of these theories globally across developed and developing countries. 
It is this gap that is now filled.
Data and methods
To estimate the variations in the level of informal employment across developed and developing 
countries, ILO (2018) harmonized data on the share of informal employment is here analysed. 
The ILO (2018) estimates are based on the analysis of 112 countries micro datasets (latest 
available national labour force surveys or similar national household surveys) representing 90% 
of global employment. The main advantage of this dataset is that it uses a common definition 
of informal employment and of informal employment in the informal sector and harmonised 
data to enhance comparability between countries (for further details, see ILO, 2018). In this 
harmonised survey, moreover, a respondent is classified as engaging in informal employment 
only if they do so as their main job. This is likely to lead to an under-estimation of the total 
prevalence of informal employment globally. 
To analyse the wider economic and social conditions that each theory associates with 
higher levels of informal employment, macro-level indicators have been used from various data 
sources for the latest available year (International Monetary Fund, 2016; Social Progress 
Imperative, 2018; Transparency International, 2017; United Nations, 2017; World Bank, 2015, 
2016a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h, 2017a,b,c; World Economic Forum, 2017). Indeed, using the latest 
available year for each indicator is an approach widely adopted in previous studies (e.g., ILO, 
2018). Country-level indicators considered important in each explanation were selected 
according to previous literature, with the same or similar country-level indicators used as in  
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previous analyses assessing these theories (e.g., Eurofound, 2013; European Commission, 
2013; Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams, 2013, 2014, 2015; Williams and Horodnic, 2015, 
2017). The outcome is that a comprehensive set of indicators are used to test the wider economic 
and social conditions that each theory associates with higher levels of informal employment.
To test modernisation theory that the level of economic development is an important 
determinant, the conventional indicator of GNP per capita is used (ILO, 2012; Yamada, 1996). 
Given the widespread criticism of this as an indicator of development (Kuznets, 1962), both 
this and additional alternative measurements of development are used similarly to previous 
studies (Williams, 2013, 2014, 2015; Williams and Horodnic, 2015, 2017), namely:
 GDP per capita. Gross domestic product per capita, current prices (purchasing power 
parity; international dollars) (International Monetary Fund, 2016).
 GNI per capita (GNI per capita, PPP current international dollars). PPP GNI is gross 
national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank, 2017a).
 Household final consumption expenditure per capita (i.e., private consumption per capita) 
(constant 2010 US$). This covers the market value of all goods and services, including 
durable products (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased by 
households. It excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for owner-
occupied dwellings and payments and fees to governments to obtain permits and licenses 
(World Bank, 2017c).
 Human Development Index (HDI). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. This is intended to 
shift the focus of development from national income accounting to people-centred policies 
(United Nations, 2017).
 Social Progress Index (SPI). This measures the extent to which countries provide for the 
social and environmental needs of their citizens. Fifty-one social and environmental 
indicators divided across three broad dimensions of social progress (basic human needs, 
foundations of wellbeing, and opportunity) show the relative performance of nations (Social 
Progress Imperative, 2018).
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Meanwhile, corruption as a measure of the lack of modernisation of governance is assessed 
using Corruption Perceptions Index and irregular payments and bribes. These indicators were 
previously used by Williams (2013, 2014, 2015) to explain the cross-national variations in the 
scale of informal employment:   
 Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived 
to be. A country or territorys score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption 
on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 
means it is perceived as very clean (Transparency International, 2017).
 Irregular payments and bribes. Average score across the five components of the following 
WE Forum Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how common is it for 
firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with: (a) imports and 
exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and 
licenses; (e) obtaining favourable judicial decisions? The indicator ranges from 1 (very 
common) to 7 (never occurs) (World Economic Forum, 2017).
To test the tenet of neo-liberal theory that informal employment is more prevalent when there 
are high taxes and state over-interference meanwhile, indicators previously used by Eurofound 
(2013), the European Commission (2013), Vanderseypen et al. (2013), Williams (2015) and 
Williams and Horodnic (2015, 2017) when assessing the assumptions of neo-liberal theory are 
used, namely:
 Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of revenue, which includes general sales and 
turnover or value added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on services, taxes 
on the use of goods or property, taxes on extraction and production of minerals, and profits 
of fiscal monopolies (World Bank, 2016a).
 Taxes on revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP. Revenue is cash receipts from 
taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from 
property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue but are excluded here (World Bank, 
2016b).
 Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the 
central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, 
penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of 
erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue (World Bank, 2016c).
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 Problematic factors for doing business: Tax rates (%) The most problematic factor for 
doing business: Tax rates (% of respondents, Executive Opinion Survey) (World Economic 
Forum, 2017).
 Total tax rate (% of profits). The total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory 
contributions payable by a business in the second year of operation, expressed as a share of 
commercial profits. The total amount of taxes is the sum of five different types of taxes and 
contributions: profit or corporate income tax, social contributions and labour taxes paid by 
the employer, property taxes, turnover taxes, and other small taxes (World Bank, 2017b).
Meanwhile, and to test political economy theory that informal employment is associated with 
the level of poverty (Williams, 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 2017), three indicators are 
analysed:
 Poverty gap at national poverty lines (%). Poverty gap at national poverty lines is the mean 
shortfall from the poverty lines (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall) as a 
percentage of the poverty lines. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its 
incidence (World Bank, 2015).
 Poverty gap at $1.90 a day. Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in 
income or consumption from the poverty line $1.90 a day (counting the nonpoor as having 
zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth 
of poverty as well as its incidence (World Bank, 2016d).
 GINI index. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, 2016e).
To evaluate both the neo-liberal theory of state over-interference and political theory of state 
under-intervention, meanwhile, indicators previously used (Eurofound, 2013; European 
Commission, 2013; Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams and Horodnic, 2017) are employed as 
well as some similar additional indicators, namely: 
 Social contributions (% of revenue). Social contributions include social security 
contributions by employees, employers, and self-employed individuals, and other 
contributions whose source cannot be determined. They also include actual or imputed 
contributions to social insurance schemes operated by governments (World Bank, 2016f).
 Expense of government (% of GDP). This is a measure of the size of government and 
therefore a loose proxy of the degree of intervention. The expense of government is the 
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level of cash payments for the operating activities of the government in providing goods 
and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest 
and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends (World 
Bank, 2016g).
To evaluate the relationship between cross-country variations in the prevalence of informal 
employment and the economic and social conditions that each theory contends are associated, 
we conduct bivariate regression analyses. Here, Spearmans rank correlation coefficient (rs) is 
used due to the non-parametric nature of the data to discover whether there are statistically 
significant strong and very strong associations (rs > 0.7).  
Findings: evaluating the competing theories
Table 2 reveals both the prevalence of informal employment, and level of informal employment 
in informal enterprises (i.e., the intensity of informality) in 112 countries. This reveals that those 
engaged in informal employment as their main job is not a minor segment of the workforce and 
of limited importance. In 61 of the 112 nations (54 per cent of the countries), over half of the 
workforce is in informal employment.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
However, marked variations exist across countries. The proportion of the workforce whose 
main job is informal employment ranges from 94.6 per cent in Burkina Faso to 1.2 per cent in 
Luxembourg, while the share of informal workers in the informal sector ranges from 92% in 
Chad to 0.9% in Luxembourg. In Benin, for instance, the proportion of the workforce whose 
main job is informal employment is 94.5 per cent, and 90.6 per cent are in informal jobs in 
informal enterprises. The Benin economy, therefore, is a predominantly informal economy.
To explain the cross-country variations in the prevalence and intensity of informal 
employment, it is first necessary to test the validity of modernisation theory. Using Spearmans 
rank correlation coefficient due to the nonparametric nature of the data, there is a very strong 
significant relationship between the level of informal employment in a country and its GNI per 
capita (rs=-.897***). There is also a statistically significant association within a 99% confidence 
interval between the share of all employment in the informal economy which is informal 
employment in informal enterprises and GNI per capita (rs=-.895***). There is also a very 
strong significant association between GDP per capita and the prevalence of informal 
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employment (rs=-.890***) as well as between the GDP per capita and the share of all 
employment in the informal economy which is informal employment in informal enterprises 
(rs=-.889***). The share of the workforce in informal employment is greater in less developed 
economies with lower levels of GNI per capita and GDP per capita. This reinforces previous 
findings (ILO, 2012; Yamada, 1996). Nevertheless, the direction of the correlation in terms of 
any cause-effect relationship cannot be established. This, in consequence, is a limitation of both 
the current as well as previous studies.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
To test modernisation theory using alternative indicators of development that examine a wider 
range of variables other than simply economic productivity, the finding is that there is a 
statistically significant relationship within a 99% confidence interval between cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment and cross-national variations in not only 
household consumption expenditure per capita (rs= -.900***) but also the Human Development 
Index (rs= -.925***).  As Figure 1 reveals, there is also a significant relationship between the 
level of informal employment in a country and the Social Progress Index (rs= -.929***). The 
share of the workforce in informal employment is higher in countries where the Social Progress 
Index is lower. Similar results are obtained when analysing the share of all employment in the 
informal economy which is informal employment in informal enterprises. Informal 
employment therefore, by a range of indicators of development, is larger in less developed 
economies, thus confirming H1a.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Turning to the second tenet of modernisation theory that informal employment is higher in 
countries where there is a lack of modernisation of governance, countries with higher perceived 
levels of public sector corruption (low levels of Corruption Perception Index) have a higher 
prevalence and intensity of informal employment (rs= -.747***; rs= -.744***). So too is there 
a significant association between the level and intensity of informal employment and irregular 
payments and bribes (rs= -.743***; rs= -.726***). The prevalence and intensity of informal 
employment is therefore larger in countries with higher levels of public sector corruption, 
confirming H1b. 
Page 12 of 27Employee Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Em
ployee Relations
13
To evaluate the tenet neo-liberal theory that informal employment is greater when taxes 
are higher, several measures of taxation levels are here analysed. Beginning with the 
relationship between the cross-national variations in the scale of informal employment and the 
level of taxes on revenue (excluding grants) as a share of GDP, the inverse of the neo-liberal 
suggestion is found. The scale and intensity of informal employment decreases as the level of 
taxes on revenue as a proportion of GDP increases and this is a statistically significant 
correlation (rs= -.647***; rs= -.635***). 
This is similarly the case when examining the level of tax revenue as a proportion of 
GDP and the level and intensity of informal employment (rs= -.446***; rs= -.443***). The 
levels of informal employment are significantly lower in countries where revenue is a higher 
proportion of GDP. Similarly, the same statistically significant relationship exists between the 
level of informal employment and employment in the informal sector and tax rates as ac 
problematic factor when doing business (rs= -.275***; rs= -.243**). Again, the scale and 
intensity of informal employment is significantly lower in countries where tax rates are often 
listed among the problematic factors when doing business. No statistical significant association 
was found between the share of informal employment and the level of taxes on goods and 
services (as a percentage of revenue) or the total tax rate (as a percentage of profits).
Therefore, insufficient evidence exists to validate the neo-liberal tenet that higher tax 
rates (H2a) result in a greater prevalence and intensity of informal employment. Instead, the 
inverse is the case; higher tax levels are correlated with a lower prevalence and intensity of 
informal employment, presumably because greater state revenue is provided for social transfers 
so that citizens can receive social protection.
To test the neo-liberal tenet that state interference leads to higher levels of informal 
employment (H2b), and the contrary political economy tenet that the scale of informal 
employment reduces with greater state intervention (H3), Table 3 reveals that when the level 
of social contributions as a percentage of revenue increases, there is a statistically significant 
decline in both the scale of informal employment (rs= -.711***) and intensity of informal 
employment (rs= -.694***). There is also a steep decline in the scale and intensity of informal 
employment as the expense of government as a share of GDP increases (rs= -.688***; rs= -
.653***). Bigger government therefore leads to a decline, rather than increase, in the prevalence 
and intensity of informal employment. The neo-liberal tenet that state interference leads to 
greater informal employment (H2b) is therefore refuted and instead, support found for the 
political economy tenet that such employment is associated with too little state intervention 
(H3). 
Page 13 of 27 Employee Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Em
ployee Relations
14
The political economy tenet that cross-national variations in the scale and intensity of 
informal employment are associated with the level of poverty is also supported. Table 3 (and 
graphically displayed in Figure 4) reveals a statistically significant relationship between cross-
national variations in the size of the poverty gap, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line 
of $1.90 per day in purchasing power parities, and cross-national variations in the scale and 
intensity of informal employment (rs= .791***; rs= .764***). Similar results are obtained when 
considering the poverty gap at national poverty lines (rs= .416***; rs= .416***). The greater 
the poverty, the higher is the scale and intensity of informal employment. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
There is also a statistically significant relationship between Gini Index and informal 
employment. The higher the income inequalities, the higher is the scale of informal employment 
(rs= .503***) and level of informal employment in the informal sector (rs= .495***). 
Discussion and Conclusions
To test three theories that variously explain that higher levels of informal employment are 
correlated with economic under-development and corruption (modernisation theory), state 
over-interference (neo-liberal theory) and inadequate state intervention to protect workers from 
poverty (political economy theory), harmonised data from 112 developed and developing 
economies comprising 90 per cent of the global workforce has been analysed. In 61 of the 112 
nations (54%), the main job of over half of the workforce is informal employment. 
Nevertheless, marked cross-national variations exist.  
Evaluating the competing theories, the finding is that although modernisation theory 
tentatively appears to be valid that informal employment is associated with under-
development and corruption, neo-liberal theory is not validated. Instead, there is tentative 
support for the political economy theory. The outcome is a call for a synthesis of the tenets of 
modernisation and political economy theory. This finding in relation to 112 developed and 
developing economies across the world representing 90 per cent of the global workforce is 
similar to the earlier findings in relation to the European Union (Williams, 2013) and 41 less 
developed economies (Williams, 2015). The tentative intimation is that across the world, lower 
levels of informal employment are associated with development and state intervention in the 
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form of higher tax rates and social transfers to protect workers from poverty. This neo-
modernisation theory appears to apply across the world. 
This relationship between informal employment and under-development, corruption, 
lower tax rates and inadequate state protection to protect workers from poverty moreover, has 
practical policy implications for governments. Besides enforcement authorities finding more 
effective ways of detecting informal employment and transforming it into formal employment 
(Eurofound, 2013; Feld and Larsen, 2012; OECD, 2012), this paper reveals that addressing 
broader economic and social conditions associated with the overarching modernisation of 
economies, state bureaucracies and social protection are also important. In other words, it shows 
that tackling informal employment cannot be treated separately from broader economic and 
social policies.  
In sum, this paper has revealed that a large proportion of the workforce across these 112 
countries are in informal employment as their main job and that the cross-country variations in 
the proportion in informal employment are associated with the level of development, 
corruption, tax rates, the size of government, level of social contributions and poverty rates. If 
this is now tested using more refined multivariate regression analysis to evaluate whether the 
same relationships hold, and data is collected to allow this to occur, then one intention of this 
paper will have been fulfilled. If this paper also encourages recognition of the importance of 
addressing wider economic and social conditions when tackling informal employment, then it 
will have achieved its wider intention.
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Table 1. Conceptualisations of the informal sphere by the unit of observation 
Economic units Informal jobs Formal jobs
Informal economic units A B
Formal economic units C D
Source: ILO (2012)
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Table 2. Share of informal employment in total employment, by country (latest available year)
Share of informal employment in total employment
Total In the informal sectorCountry Code
(%) (Rank) (%) (Rank)
Region1)
Burkina Faso BF 94.6 1 65.5 34 A
Benin BJ 94.5 2 90.6 4 A
Nepal NP 94.3 3 90.7 3 D
Rwanda RW 94.3 4 90.9 2 A
Angola AO 94.1 5 77.1 23 A
Chad TD 94.0 6 92.0 1 A
Uganda UG 93.7 7 87.6 7 A
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic LA 93.6 8 86.7 8 D
Madagascar MG 93.6 9 83.6 13 A
Cambodia KH 93.1 10 77.5 21 D
Nigeria NG 92.9 11 80.4 17 A
Côte dIvoire CI 92.8 12 86.0 9 A
Togo TG 92.8 13 80.6 16 A
Mali ML 92.7 14 74.2 24 A
Sierra Leone SL 92.5 15 89.8 5 A
Congo, Democratic Republic of the CD 91.9 16 88.2 6 A
Niger NE 91.3 17 77.3 22 A
Senegal SN 91.2 18 70.9 28 A
Cameroon CM 90.9 19 83.7 12 A
Tanzania, United Republic of TZ 90.6 20 83.5 14 A
Ghana GH 90.1 21 84.8 10 A
Comoros KM 89.2 22 84.6 11 A
Bangladesh BD 89.0 23 48.9 50 D
India IN 88.2 24 80.9 15 D
Zambia ZM 87.9 25 79.0 19 A
Liberia LR 86.8 26 79.1 18 A
Myanmar MM 85.7 27 71.5 26 D
Indonesia ID 85.6 28 67.5 32 D
Congo CG 85.3 29 56.9 42 A
Bolivia, Plurinational State of BO 83.1 30 68.7 30 B
Malawi MW 83.0 31 74.1 25 A
Pakistan PK 82.4 32 77.6 20 D
Honduras HN 79.9 33 70.0 29 B
Morocco MA 79.9 34 58.7 40 A
Guatemala GT 79.7 35 63.3 35 B
Yemen YE 77.8 36 68.5 31 C
Nicaragua NI 77.4 37 71.5 27 B
Gambia GM 76.7 38 62.5 36 A
Viet Nam VN 76.2 39 61.0 37 D
Tajikistan TJ 74.8 40 54.4 46 E
Timor-Leste TL 71.8 41 56.9 43 D
Paraguay PY 70.6 42 46.0 54 B
Sri Lanka LK 70.4 43 60.6 38 D
Syrian Arab Republic SY 70.1 44 66.0 33 C
El Salvador SV 69.6 45 53.9 47 B
Peru PE 69.2 46 55.5 45 B
Namibia NA 67.0 47 46.8 52 A
Iraq IQ 66.9 48 59.7 39 C
Botswana BW 65.6 49 52.1 49 A
Occupied Palestinian Territory PS 64.3 50 31.2 66 C
Egypt EG 63.3 51 58.5 41 A
Albania AL 61.0 52 29.1 69 E
Colombia CO 60.6 53 55.9 44 B
Ecuador EC 59.0 54 46.4 53 B
Tunisia TN 58.8 55 53.3 48 A
Dominican Republic DO 56.3 56 37.4 58 B
China CN 54.4 57 48.4 51 D
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Mongolia MN 53.5 58 45.7 55 D
Mexico MX 53.4 59 29.1 70 B
Panama PA 52.3 60 34.3 60 B
Armenia AM 52.1 61 39.2 57 E
Kyrgyz Republic KG 48.6 62 37.2 59 E
Argentina AR 47.2 63 32.8 61 B
Cabo Verde CV 46.5 64 31.9 65 A
Brazil BR 46.0 65 30.3 67 B
Jordan JO 44.9 66 43.9 56 C
Chile CL 40.5 67 32.2 62 B
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of VE 39.7 68 26.3 73 B
Costa Rica CR 39.1 69 27.4 71 B
Poland PL 38.0 70 20.1 79 E
Russian Federation RU 35.9 71 24.4 75 E
Samoa WS 35.7 72 21.7 78 D
Turkey TR 34.8 73 32.0 64 E
South Africa ZA 34.0 74 21.8 77 A
Greece GR 32.8 75 32.2 63 E
Brunei Darussalam BN 31.9 76 4.0 110 D
Korea, Republic of KR 31.5 77 26.1 74 D
Bosnia and Herzegovina BA 30.1 78 30.0 68 E
Moldova, Republic of MD 28.9 79 21.9 76 E
Romania RO 28.9 80 27.4 72 E
Spain ES 27.3 81 17.3 81 E
Uruguay UY 24.5 82 19.6 80 B
Serbia RS 22.1 83 6.4 102 E
Italy IT 19.0 84 16.0 84 E
Japan JP 18.7 85 14.3 87 D
United States US 18.6 86 16.6 82 B
Slovakia SK 16.7 87 16.4 83 E
Bulgaria BG 15.9 88 15.0 85 E
Cyprus CY 15.1 89 15.0 86 E
United Kingdom GB 13.6 90 13.5 88 E
Belgium BE 13.5 91 10.8 94 E
Ireland IE 13.5 92 11.8 91 E
Latvia LV 13.2 93 11.2 93 E
Croatia HR 13.0 94 12.8 89 E
Lithuania LT 12.6 95 8.2 99 E
Hungary HU 12.2 96 11.8 92 E
Portugal PT 12.1 97 11.9 90 E
Denmark DK 11.2 98 4.1 109 E
Switzerland CH 10.4 99 4.2 108 E
Germany DE 10.2 100 9.7 95 E
Austria AT 10.0 101 8.8 96 E
France FR 9.8 102 5.4 104 E
Netherlands NL 9.4 103 8.4 98 E
Czech Republic CZ 9.2 104 8.6 97 E
Sweden SE 8.2 105 2.6 111 E
Malta MT 8.1 106 7.9 100 E
Norway NO 7.4 107 7.1 101 E
Estonia EE 6.9 108 5.4 105 E
Finland FI 6.3 109 6.2 103 E
Slovenia SI 5.0 110 4.8 106 E
Iceland IS 4.9 111 4.6 107 E
Luxembourg LU 1.2 112 0.9 112 E
Note: 1) A: Africa; B: Americas; C: Arab States; D: Asia and the Pacific; E: Europe and Central Asia.
Source: derived from ILO (2018) harmonized data on the share of informal employment in total employment.
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Table 3. Economic and social characteristics associated with higher levels of informal 
employment, by theoretical perspective (latest available year)
Share of informal employment in total 
employment
Theoretical perspective/ Indicator
No. of 
countries
Total
In the informal 
sector
Modernisation Explanation
Level of development
GDP per capitab) 110 -0.890*** -0.889***
GNI per capitae) 110 -0.897*** -0.895***
Household final consumption per capitae) 109 -0.900*** -0.890***
Human Development Indexd) 111 -0.925*** -0.915***
Social Progress Indexf) 100 -0.929*** -0.913***
Governance/ Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Indexd) 110 -0.747*** -0.744***
Irregular payments and bribesd) 107 -0.743*** -0.726***
Neo-Liberal Thesis 
High taxes
Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue)c) 99 0.059 0.027
Taxes on revenue (excl. grants) (% of GDP)c) 101 -0.647*** -0.635***
Tax revenue (% of GDP)c) 100 -0.446*** -0.443***
Problematic factorsh): Tax rates (%)d) 100 -0.275*** -0.243**
Total tax rate (% of profits)b) 100 0.043 0.079
Political Economy Thesis
Level of poverty
Poverty gap at national poverty lines (%)a) 56 0.416*** 0.416***
Poverty gap at $1.90 a dayc) 107 0.791*** 0.764***
GINI indexc) 107 0.503*** 0.495***
Neo-Liberal and Political Economy Explanations
State interference
Social contributions (% of revenue)c) 97 -0.711*** -0.694***
Expense of government (% of GDP)c) 100 -0.688*** -0.653***
Strength of the Spearmans correlation coefficient:
.00-.19 | very weak .20-.39 | weak .40-.59 | moderate .60-.79 | strong .80-1.0 | very strong
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note:  a) 2015 data or latest available | b) 2016 data | c) 2016 data or latest available | d) 2017 data | e) 2017 data or 
latest available | f) 2018 data | g) latest available year data | h) Problematic factors for doing business.
Source: own calculations based on data from ILO (2018) (harmonized data on the share of informal employment 
in total employment) and Social Progress Imperative (2018), Transparency International (2017), United Nations 
(2017), World Bank (2017a,b,c,d, 2016a,b,c,d,e,f,g, 2015), World Economic Forum (2017), International 
Monetary Fund (2016).
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Figure 1. elationship between the share of informal employment in total employment and 
Social Progress Index (latest available year)
Source: own calculations based on data from ILO (2018) for harmonized data on the share of informal employment 
in total employment and Social Progress Imperative (2018) for Social Progress Index. 
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